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considering both its formal path to membership and the evolving calculus by which its views 
of the process were structured, focusing on elements such as the enabling context provided 
by a change of national government in 2008, the impact of the global financial crisis, and the 
position of Australia. Drawing on a set of interviews undertaken within the New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), it goes on to examine perceived benefits of the 
Asia–Europe Meeting for New Zealand, and the extent to which these have been achieved. 
Finally, it addresses the issue of a New Zealand ASEM strategy, outlining potential areas for 
future engagement. 
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In 2010, at its eighth Summit, New Zealand joined the Asia–Europe Meeting process 
alongside two other new entrants – Australia and Russia – bringing the number of 
participants to 48 from an initial 26.1 New Zealand’s path to membership was a long one – 
15 years from its first expression of interest preceding the inaugural Summit in 1996 until its 
formal accession. Despite this long timeframe, however, it’s accession was in the end 
something of a rush job, a scramble to respond to events rather than the product of any 
genuine enthusiasm for the forum. This article examines New Zealand’s engagement with 
ASEM, guided by three core questions: (i) what was New Zealand’s path to membership, and 
what were the key factors underpinning its final decision to join?; (ii) what potential benefits 
does New Zealand see as stemming from its engagement with the process, and how has it 
performed in this regard?; and finally (iii) what shape should a New Zealand strategy for 
engagement with ASEM take? 
 
The Long and Winding Road: New Zealand’s Path to Accession 
The issue of extending membership has always been a thorny one for ASEM. One motivation 
for the European Union’s (EU) initial engagement in the process was its exclusion of 
Myanmar at a time when conflict over its human rights record had effectively hamstrung 
cooperation in the EU–ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) framework. This 
raised the prospect that future accessions to the Asia–Europe Meeting would be carefully 
considered and potentially contentious. Further complicating the enlargement issue was the 
binary nature of the forum, premised upon two groups cohering around particular identities 
and effectively requiring that new members be demonstrably European or Asian. This was 
reinforced by early agreement on a ‘double key’ approach to expansion, with each side 
selecting its own members subject to approval by all ASEM states. 
New Zealand’s approach to ASEM membership was tentative at best. In part this 
stemmed from prior experience. When Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had 
proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1990, he had firmly rebuffed expressions 
of interest from New Zealand and Australia. Consequently, a certain amount of caution on 
the part of New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was evident in its 
                                                             




approach to ASEM (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). In the event, such 
concerns proved to be well-founded. When New Zealand and Australia raised membership 
prior to the inaugural Summit, the views of Mahathir proved an insurmountable obstacle. 
While firm support was forthcoming from the European states, Japan, South Korea and the 
Philippines, opposition from Malaysia and Thailand (Baker 1996, 20; Skelton 1997, 21) 
meant an effective veto on entry. The key remained Mahathir’s opposition which, when 
filtered through ASEAN’s consensus principle, meant that the Association stood as an 
effective block to any prospect of expanding the forum southwards. 
For New Zealand, Mahathir’s position led to the shelving of its early ASEM 
aspirations, a fact reflected in diplomatic communications of the time: ‘the key to 
movement on this issue … remains Prime Minister Mahathir … We believe that any chance 
we might have of gaining some early concession would not be enhanced by more vigorous 
representation at this stage which [he] might feel compelled to resist, even publicly’ (quoted 
in Rolfe 2005, 47–8). In short, the potential benefits of ASEM were considered insufficient to 
outweigh the effort of campaigning for membership. A conscious decision was therefore 
made to set aside the ASEM issue until the Mahathir problem had been resolved (interview 
with senior MFAT official, June 2012).  
This cost–benefit calculation became more firmly entrenched over the following 
decade as MFAT’s view of the utility of the process gradually dimmed. As is discussed in 
more detail below, early interest in membership had been conditioned largely by the 
expectation that ASEM would deliver substantive results, particularly around trade 
liberalisation, the failure of which to eventuate reinforced the Ministry’s resourcing calculus. 
Indeed, the low priority accorded to the Asia–Europe Meeting is evidenced by its total 
absence from key MFAT documentation of the period. Thus, for example, the 2007 White 
Paper Our Future with Asia which established a framework for engagement with the region, 
urging greater integration into the Asian architecture and highlighting the ‘need to be 
included in the new regional structures that are being put in place’ (MFAT 2007, 19), notably 
excluded ASEM from its consideration.2 Further, the sixteen Annual Reports, Statements of 
Intent, and Briefs to the Incoming Minister published by the Ministry between 2002 and 
2010, while routinely emphasising the need to participate in regional structures, completely 
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overlooked ASEM. As a consequence, it was largely Australian efforts that kept the 
membership issue, even if only intermittently, on the agenda. For MFAT, so long as Australia 
was also excluded from the process, there was no pressing need for New Zealand to push 
for accession (interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012). In effect, 
responsibility for policy on ASEM membership had been abdicated to the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
The events of 2008/2009 were therefore something of a surprise for MFAT. The 
Ministry received no warning from their counterparts when, in mid-2008, Australia applied 
to join ASEM, leaving them ‘to some extent, scrambling’ (interview of former senior MFAT 
official, April 2012). The subsequent quick extension of feelers to the European Commission 
as to the value of New Zealand membership further reinforced the view that MFAT had 
been wrong-footed by the Australian move and had no real policy in place to cater for the 
eventuality. In the event, the Ministry resolved to adopt a wait and see approach, with a 
final decision to be made only when the prospects for Australia’s entry were clearer.  
The Australian approach to ASEM was itself complicated by the concurrent 
application of Russia. While substantive objections on the Asian side had largely dissipated 
after Mahathir left office (interview with Malaysian Foreign Ministry official, June 2012), it 
was recognised (most notably by Singapore) that the Russian application raised broader 
issues of membership that would need to be addressed before Australia could be admitted. 
Russia’s Asian credentials were regarded as questionable by the Asian ASEM members, with 
the case instead being made that it should enter as part of the European grouping. The 
Europeans in turn argued that membership on their side was restricted to EU member 
states: that ASEM was, in fact, the Asia–EU Meeting. The compromise reached at the ninth 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM) in May 2009 was a ‘Temporary Third Grouping’, neither 
European nor Asian, but instead comprised of these leftover states. On this basis, Australian 
membership was approved.  
While New Zealand’s membership was not formally addressed at the FMM, informal 
discussions between Asian and Commission officials suggested that no objections would be 
raised in principle. However, when New Zealand’s application was lodged in September 
2009, it was complicated by the prospect that its wait and see approach may have led it to 
‘miss the boat’ (interview with senior Commission official, July 2011). Indeed, a number of 
Asian states asserted that membership matters could only be decided by a Foreign 
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Ministers’ Meeting, which would in effect have placed the application on hold until it could 
be considered by the tenth FMM in June 2011. New Zealand owed its earlier accession to 
the action of the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
which argued that approval could be given by Foreign Ministers outside of a scheduled 
Ministerial Meeting. In practice, and in the face of some opposition, the Cambodian Senior 
Official on ASEM3 took it upon himself to contact all member state Foreign Ministers by 
letter, declaring that unless specific objections were raised, assent would be presumed and 
New Zealand would become a member (interview with former senior MFAT official, April 
2012). No formal objections being forthcoming, New Zealand joined as part of the 
Temporary Third Grouping alongside Australia and Russia at the eighth Summit in 2010. 
 
To Join, or Not to Join? New Zealand’s Changing Calculus of Accession 
Setting aside the formal path by which it joined the forum, New Zealand’s evolving view of 
ASEM – from early interest, to subsequent disinterest, and the final volte-face which saw it 
accede at the eighth Summit – was underpinned by a calculus of accession incorporating a 
number of elements. As previously noted, intrinsic to the early expression of interest in the 
ASEM was a set of expectations as to what the process would deliver. A number of factors 
framed the initial agreement to establish ASEM, structuring many of the expectations as to 
the role it would perform. For the Europeans, for example, it offered an alternative to the 
deadlocked dialogue with ASEAN which had been undermined by disagreements over 
human rights and the membership of Myanmar in the Association. For the Southeast Asians 
it offered a foundation for increased cooperation and integration within East Asia, making a 
reality of the earlier EAEC proposal. More significant, however were the motivations relating 
to addressing a perceived ‘missing link’ in the global triadic architecture, and concerns about 
economic marginalisation. 
 The conception of ASEM as filling a ‘missing link’ was a key element in Goh Chok 
Tong’s proposal, with a new Asia–Europe dialogue being seen as a necessary complement 
and balance to existing relationships among the triad of regions, embodied in the EU–US 
Transatlantic Partnership and in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework. It 
was particularly as a mirror to the latter that Goh envisaged ASEM, advocating the creation 
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of ‘Pacific-style’ ties between the two regions (Pou Serradell 1996, 186). By casting the Asia–
Europe Meeting as a mirror and response to APEC, a link was drawn directly between the 
functioning of Asia-Pacific cooperation and that of the new forum such that APEC’s 
evolution through the early 1990s played a significant role in framing perceptions about 
ASEM. While APEC had been operative since 1989, it had only convened its first Summit in 
1993, on which occasion it agreed for the first time a set of reciprocal trade concessions. 
This was followed in 1994 by the tabling of plans for a Pacific Free Trade Area. As a 
consequence, it was increasingly seen as leaving behind its reputation as a talking shop, 
pushing instead towards the delivery of substantive results. With the link to ASEM drawn, 
these initiatives helped to raise clear expectations that the Asia–Europe Meeting too would 
move rapidly towards the achievement of concrete goals, notably in the area of trade 
liberalisation.  
Alongside the influence of APEC, ASEM was also the product of the economic 
concerns of its founding members. The EU’s reappraisal of its relations with Asia, embodied 
in the 1994 New Asia Strategy (European Commission 1994), highlighted the centrality of 
economic matters in its approach to the region, making clear that the primary factor 
motivating the push for closer relations was concern at missing out on the growth that was 
occurring there. Similarly, economic priorities were a motivation for the Asian states, and 
particularly the members of ASEAN concerned with Europe’s turn to its eastern 
neighbourhood and underpinned by perennial fears that the common market was evolving 
into a fortress. A link with Europe mirroring the economic and commercially focused tie with 
the United States embodied in APEC was therefore seen as essential (Pou Seradell 1996, 
186–8). 
 Expectations for ASEM were, then, from the outset high. The European Council made 
this clear when it asserted that the new institution must pursue ‘concrete and substantial 
results’ (European Council 1995, 43). While the process was clearly also a political one, the 
prominence of economic concerns made substantive cooperation in trade and financial 
matters the primary anticipated outcome of engagement, and indeed this expectation 
structured the early history of the process. The years following the first Summit saw the 
establishment of separate Economic and Finance Ministers’ Meetings, a Senior Officials’ 
Meeting on Trade and Investment, a Customs Directors-General and Commissioners’ 
Meeting and an Asia–Europe Business Forum, as well as the first steps being taken toward 
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the creation of a Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and an Investment Promotion Action 
Plan (IPAP). The launching of the TFAP and IPAP initiatives in particular raised the spectre 
that institutionalised rules and procedures would emerge to guide the facilitation and 
liberalisation of Asia–Europe trade and investment relations (Yeo 2003, 155). 
 Such institutional proliferation quickly became a characteristic of ASEM, reflecting a 
form of ‘cooperation malaise’: the creation of new structures was increasingly a substitute 
for the anticipated substantive engagement. The result has been the increasing breadth of 
the process, while depth of cooperation has remained limited and substantive outcomes 
have failed to eventuate. In part this failure has been the product of a capability–
expectations gap, with anticipated outcomes being premised upon a level of cooperation 
that has proven beyond the ability of the ASEM partners to achieve (Doidge 2011, 172–4). 
Additionally, and exacerbating this first difficulty, is the informal nature of cooperation, 
embodied in the lack of an administrative secretariat, non-binding and consensual decision-
taking, and the preference for soft law instruments. The lack of institutional memory in the 
form of a secretariat has, for example, meant that meetings under the ASEM umbrella have 
frequently been characterised by a lack of awareness of the content of prior discussions, 
and consequently have often ploughed the same turf, impacting the pace of cooperation 
(interview with Commission official, cited in Doidge 2011, 119), while the non-binding 
nature of any decisions taken has meant that agreements can be read only as indicative 
rather than substantive. Given these norms of cooperation, it may be argued that ASEM’s 
structure was from the outset suited more to dialogue than to the delivery of concrete 
goals. 
It is in this context that New Zealand’s view of ASEM must be seen. Its early 
expression of interest was a product of the heightened expectations surrounding the 
establishment of Asia–Europe cooperation. From the 1990s, issues of trade liberalisation 
and market access gained particular emphasis in New Zealand’s external relations, reflecting 
both a general cross-party political consensus emergent since the neoliberal turn of the 
fourth Labour government,4 as well as the direction being taken at the global level, 
embodied for example in the founding of the World Trade Organisation and in the new 
APEC agenda. New Zealand had signed its first comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in 
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1983 – the Closer Economic Relations (CER) arrangement with Australia – and the 
establishment of similar frameworks was to become a central feature of its trade strategy 
over subsequent decades. Alongside this was an increasing strategic focus on Asian markets. 
ASEM seemed to offer a framework within which a small player like New Zealand could 
pursue these policy goals effectively. This impetus, however, waned over time: when the 
process failed to deliver anticipated results, it became devalued in the eyes of MFAT. There 
was, quite simply, a lack of any sense that ASEM had proved significant, particularly around 
priority issues for New Zealand (interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012). 
Reinforcing this waning enthusiasm for membership was the issue of resourcing, and the 
calculation that the cost of engaging in the process to the level likely to be expected by 
other participants was beyond MFAT’s capacity to meet (interview with former senior MFAT 
official, April 2012), an issue that continues to have resonance for New Zealand’s 
engagement. 
This calculus clearly changed in 2008/2009, leading ultimately to New Zealand’s 
accession to the process. Three factors were prominent. The first was the enabling context 
provided by the election of a new government. On the basis of the calculations outlined 
above, the decision not to pursue membership had become the default setting for the fifth 
Labour government, in office for the decade from 1999 to 2008. When it was succeeded by 
the fifth National government, the inertia of that default position to an extent disappeared 
(interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012), with the incoming Foreign Minister 
– Murray McCully – taking a fresh look at New Zealand’s external engagement. 
Second, and more importantly, was the changed international circumstance 
engendered by the global financial crisis, and the apparent impact of this on the ASEM 
process. Simply, for a brief moment in 2008, ASEM seemed to gain increased relevance and 
utility in the global context. With the agreement to hold the inaugural G-20 Summit in 
November of that year to address the crisis, the coincidence of the convening of the seventh 
ASEM Summit in Beijing in the preceding October lent the process added prominence, 
comprising as it did ten of the European and Asian G-20 members (including the European 
Commission) (see Figure 1).5 The ASEM Summit therefore became a useful preparatory 
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forum for the G-20, and indeed was seen to have been particularly beneficial in generating a 
level of agreement on issues which could potentially have produced stalemate in discussions 
(e.g. on IMF and World Bank voting reform) (interview with Commission official, cited in 
Doidge 2011, 126). In other words, it was seen as performing something of a clearing house 
function for the G-20. This seemed to suggest that ASEM was becoming more relevant to 
global governance, raising the apparent value of forum presence. Indeed it was off the back 
of the ASEM 7/G-20 concurrence that Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided to 
pursue membership. For New Zealand, too, the Beijing Summit was something of a turning 
point in its perception of the process, raising the prospect that ASEM would build on this 
experience to become a useful forum for dialogue on matters of substance (interview with 
senior MFAT official, May 2012). There was therefore a feeling that if such was to be the 
case, New Zealand needed to be involved (ibid.).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE – LANDSCAPE (CURRENTLY APPENDED TO PAPER)] 
 
Nevertheless, on its own, this apparent increase in the utility of ASEM was 
insufficient to reverse New Zealand’s stance. It was a third element – the membership of 
Australia – that constituted the trigger. As previously noted, Australia’s position was a 
significant factor for MFAT – so long as Australia was out, New Zealand’s non-membership 
was no cause for concern. The approval of the Australian application by the 2009 FMM left 
MFAT facing the prospect that New Zealand would be the only regional state not a member 
of ASEM, a situation deemed untenable (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). 
Asserted McCully:  ‘We certainly didn't want to be the only East Asia Summit nation not to 
be there and that would have been the consequences of not joining’ (Young 2010). 
Together, these three elements altered the ASEM calculus for New Zealand: with the 
incoming National government looking afresh at the country’s external engagements, with 
the seventh Summit raising the prospect that the process would evolve in a useful direction, 
and with Australia’s membership application and acceptance, New Zealand accession 
became a priority for McCully. Nevertheless, this was not a wholehearted endorsement of 
the forum: rather than on any substantial belief in the efficacy of ASEM, the decision to join 
was premised upon a wish not to be absent should the process begin to deliver substantive 
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outcomes (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). It was a defensive response – 
membership as an insurance policy.  
 
New Zealand’s Engagement with ASEM 
With its accession to ASEM seen as insurance against potential future significance, rather 
than the product of a clearly articulated view of the forum’s value, there was no expectation 
on the part of MFAT that New Zealand would be a particularly active player (interview with 
former senior MFAT official, April 2012). Rather, its touch would be a light one – a flag on 
the table and not much more (ibid.) – an approach requiring a minimal resource 
commitment while continuing a tradition in New Zealand foreign policy of keeping a finger 
in every pie (ibid.). Nevertheless, despite this low level of commitment, and the absence of a 
coherently structured strategy for engagement beyond the minimum, a number of potential 
benefits of membership are recognised within MFAT. These fall into two broad areas: (i) 
dialogue and access; and (ii) reinforcing presence. 
 
ASEM as an Arena for Dialogue and Access 
Despite continuing rhetoric around substantive engagement, the underperformance of 
ASEM in this respect has generally been recognised. What has become increasingly evident 
since its inception, however, is a progressive evolution, a transformation in expectations for 
the dialogue, moving beyond the initial view that the process should deliver ‘concrete and 
substantial results’ (European Council 1995, 43) and toward a level of satisfaction with its 
role as a framework for dialogue without preconceptions. As the structure of ASEM has 
become progressively more dense, it has gained value in the eyes of participants as a 
political space, an ideational and discursive process, acting as a framework for dialogue, as a 
filter for global fora, as an arena for socialization and norm diffusion, and as a mechanism 
for securitisation (Doidge 2011, 142–3), increasing ‘comfort levels’ and building trust and 
understanding among participants (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012; interview 
with senior Commission official, July 2011). 
ASEM’s utility in this respect is recognised within MFAT, with a view that there is 
benefit in developing a greater understanding of regional perspectives on a variety of issues, 
and that, in the absence of substantive outcomes, this may prove to be the raison d’être of 
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the forum (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). Indeed, ASEM’s informality 
fosters this process, providing the space to discuss matters in an open fashion on the 
understanding that this does not constitute a firm commitment in the global arena. As a 
consequence, ASEM has proven useful for addressing topics, sometimes of a sensitive 
nature, which are not considered elsewhere – the Myanmar issue, for example (interview 
with Malaysian Foreign Ministry official, June 2012). In this respect, Governors’ Meetings of 
the Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF) have been identified within MFAT as facilitating 
dialogue on a range of issues in a manner not often seen in other fora (interview with senior 
MFAT official, June 2012). 
 Beyond this general process, for New Zealand two specific benefits are identifiable, 
both of which are related to the expansiveness of the dialogue and its broad membership. 
The first is the potential use of the forum as a mechanism for addressing priority issues. This 
could, for example, involve utilising ASEM as a framework through which to identify 
partners with whom cooperation on global issues may be beneficial (interview with former 
senior MFAT official, April 2012): as a small player, New Zealand’s foreign strategy relies 
heavily upon the ability to form such coalitions of interest in the broader global system. In 
addition, however, is the facility for arranging meetings and working groups within ASEM on 
issues of interest, which may engage a small or large subset of member states, occur in 
single or multiple iterations, and involve simple information sharing or act as a seed for 
deeper cooperation (interview with senior Commission official, July 2011). This has been 
particularly evident under the forum’s Social, Cultural and Educational Pillar (the ASEF 
Pillar), with events addressing labour relations, child welfare, education and so on seen as 
providing significant value to membership (interview with Malaysia Foreign Ministry official, 
June 2012). 
The second broader benefit is facilitating access to European and Asian leaders and 
officials, with the opportunity to arrange bilateral, or even minilateral, meetings in the 
margins of the various ASEM fora.6 Most obviously this means gaining access to the larger 
powers, facilitated by the fact that ASEM is a smaller pond than other fora in which New 
Zealand is involved (e.g. the UN General Assembly), but it also means engaging smaller and 
more peripheral (at least as far as New Zealand is concerned) partners. This is seen to be 
                                                             
6 This relates directly, for example, to the Asia White Paper’s call to raise the tempo of engagement with Asia 
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potentially the greatest single benefit of participation (interview with senior MFAT official, 
May 2012). Multilateral institutions have always been important to New Zealand in this 
respect, supplementing what is by necessity a limited network of High Commissions and 
Embassies scattered around the world. Resource constraints mean that MFAT has fewer 
than 700 offshore staff, spread across 53 delegations, with further cross-accreditations 
providing a light touch on most states. Among the ASEM membership, MFAT has formal 
delegations in 23 states (including the European Union) with cross-accreditations to a 
further 22, while 22 states (including the EU) have embassies in New Zealand with cross-
accreditations from a further 21 (see Figure 1). ASEM therefore provides an opportunity to 
regularly engage with officials from an array of states with which, cross-accreditations 
notwithstanding, existing relationships are extremely shallow (interview with senior MFAT 
official, May 2012), allowing MFAT to increase its understanding of these actors and their 
priorities. 
 Nevertheless, the potential benefit to be gained by New Zealand in these respects is 
currently undermined by the low level of its engagement. The previously noted light touch 
approach to the Asia–Europe Meeting has limited exposure to the ongoing interaction that 
could make a reality of the dialogue and access elements highlighted. This is a product of 
the relative level of importance accorded to ASEM when compared to other fora in which 
New Zealand participates: more significant for reasons of utility and potential economic 
benefit are APEC and the EAS, while ASEAN and its associated structures remain the priority 
in Asia as a vehicle for engagement with a number of its primary trading partners (interview 
with senior MFAT official, May 2012). Here again the resourcing calculation plays its part. 
With only 1340 staff and a budget of NZ$500 million (US$400 million) (Government of New 
Zealand 2012, 120), MFAT’s resources are limited. As a low priority, the resources dedicated 
to ASEM are correspondingly small – currently only a desk officer in Wellington with part-
time responsibility for ASEM matters. While this clearly contrasts with the high resourcing 
allocated by states such as China and Indonesia (each with a dedicated division within 
Foreign Affairs) which are actively seeking to exercise influence through the process, a more 
realistic comparison is the lower but still more significant resourcing of a state such as 
Malaysia, with two Foreign Affairs officers assigned, and with further ASEM responsible 
officers within six other Ministries – a perceived necessity given the breadth of the process 
(interview with Malaysian Foreign Ministry official, June 2012). While seen within MFAT as 
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being an appropriate level of resourcing (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012), 
such limitations have meant that New Zealand has been a reactive rather than proactive 
participant (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012), so far failing to make a 
significant impact within the process (interview with Malaysia Foreign Ministry official, June 
2012).  
 
ASEM as a Tool for Reinforcing Presence 
Beyond these dialogue and access elements, ASEM is seen as a mechanism for reinforcing 
presence, with two components identifiable. The first involves reinforcing the engagement 
of key partners in regions of significance to New Zealand. Harking back to the foundation of 
ASEM itself, for example, is the role of the forum in increasing Europe’s presence in Asia, 
and in particular pushing it to spread its focus beyond China (interview with senior MFAT 
official, June 2012). In this respect, European soft power engagement, including the 
contribution of ideas and resources on matters of trade, development and integration, are 
seen to be an important factor in the future security and stability of the Asian region (ibid.).  
The presence issue is also, however, conceived in broader terms, with ASEM seen as 
a means of bringing European and Asian partners into areas of particular interest to New 
Zealand. It is a mechanism for cementing the EU not simply into a narrowly defined Asia, but 
into the wider Asia-Pacific region, and for drawing it and the Asian members further south 
toward the small island states of the Pacific. Asia–Europe engagement on matters to do with 
the South Pacific – be it on issues of trade, development, or the environment – is seen to be 
an important potential outcome of New Zealand’s ASEM engagement (ibid.). 
The second element is the view that ASEM provides an additional mechanism for 
reinforcing New Zealand’s own presence in Asia, a central goal of its foreign policy strategy. 
Alongside the EAS, APEC and the various ASEAN fora, the Asia–Europe Meeting provides a 
means by which New Zealand can demonstrate its Asian credentials (interview with senior 
MFAT official, June 2012), making a claim to be a part of the broader Asian caucus (rather 
than an Asian state), fully integrated into the structures of the region (MFAT 2007, 19). This 
has involved the progressive layering of fora within which New Zealand engages with its 
Asian partners, either explicitly as part of an Asian grouping (EAS, FEALAC) or in a framework 
engaging with Asian states (APEC, ASEAN PMC, ASEAN–CER etc.). ASEM is seen as one more 
piece in this puzzle, further deepening New Zealand’s integration into the regional 
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architecture (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). This aspect, however, was 
initially somewhat undermined by the membership compromise involved in the 
establishment of the Temporary Third Grouping. New Zealand, alongside Australia, was a 
casualty of Russia’s application and disagreement over where precisely it should fit. With a 
solution found at the Senior Officials’ Meeting in Copenhagen in March 2012 – with the EU 
dropping its requirement that the European side comprise only Union member states 
(opening the path for Norway and Switzerland to accede) as a quid pro quo for Asian 
acceptance of Russia among their number – the Temporary Third Grouping was dissolved, 
and New Zealand was folded into the Asian side. 
 While formal integration into the Asian side was a matter of some significance for 
New Zealand (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012), in practice it had already 
begun to adopt strategies to align itself more clearly with the Asian grouping. In 2011, for 
example, a decision was made to move responsibility for ASEM from the Asia to the Europe 
Division within MFAT, thus calibrating the administration of the process with its Asian 
counterparts. This was based firmly on the view that ASEM provided New Zealand with an 
opportunity to work closely with the Asian countries, and it therefore made greater sense to 
have an equivalency of representation within ASEM fora (interview with former senior 
MFAT official, April 2012). Similarly, efforts were made with regard to participation in the 
governance of the Asia–Europe Foundation to ensure that New Zealand’s regional 
preferences were clear. From the outset, New Zealand’s ASEF Governor caucused with his 
Asian counterparts, effectively inviting himself to take part so as to allow no assumption to 
emerge other than that New Zealand should be a member of the Asian grouping (interview 
with senior MFAT official, June 2012). For New Zealand, then, its formal incorporation 
alongside its Asian partners was simply the final destination on a path down which it had 
already been moving. 
Beyond the membership and forum layering aspect of integration into the Asian 
region is the demonstration of credibility: showing New Zealand to be a serious, committed 
and vitally engaged participant in the regional architecture (interview with senior MFAT 
official, May 2012). In the absence of an Asian identity, this is a way to establish the 
legitimacy of its presence in Asian fora and initiatives, helping to inculcate both a view that 
it has something to contribute, and a sense that its own interests and those of Asia are 
intertwined, two elements highlighted prominently in the 2007 Asia White Paper (MFAT 
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2007, 6). Stated one former MFAT official closely involved in the accession process: ‘If we 
are to establish and register ourselves as being serious about wanting to build links, and 
build membership and participation in an Asian forum, we have to be willing to accept that 
sometimes this will take us into organisations and into spaces which are Asian priorities, 
even if they are not necessarily New Zealand priorities’ (interview with former senior MFAT 
official, April 2012). Indeed, it was such engagement with the region that meant that New 
Zealand’s (and Australia’s) accession to ASEM in 2010 was viewed far more positively by 
Asian states than was that of Russia (interview with Malaysian Foreign Ministry official, 12 
June 2012). 
Nevertheless, New Zealand’s subsequent performance within the process has done 
little to reinforce the view that it is a serious and committed partner. The eighth Summit in 
October 2010 provided the first opportunity to engage with forum members at the highest 
level and, notwithstanding attendance at some prior officials’ meetings, constituted in effect 
New Zealand’s formal debut in ASEM. Prior to the Summit, while never declaring Prime 
Minister John Key’s non-attendance, MFAT was careful to avoid committing to his presence 
(interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012). Such caution notwithstanding, 
when Key did not appear at the meeting, with New Zealand instead represented by Deputy 
Prime Minister Bill English and Foreign Minister Murray McCully, questions were raised as to 
its commitment to the process.7 Indeed, Key’s absence led a number of Asian states to raise 
the possibility of a rule requiring new members to attend their first Summit at the Head of 
State or Government level, with one representative going so far as to suggest that the 
accession of new members be put on hold until such time as they were able to do so 
(interview with senior Commission official, July 2011). Questions as to the seriousness of 
commitment were further reinforced when the Foreign Minister failed to attend the tenth 
FMM in Hungary in June 2011 – the first convened since New Zealand’s accession – and, 
despite criticisms of his earlier non-appearance, Prime Minister John Key was again absent 
from the ninth Summit in November 2012. While such non-attendance has been 
acknowledged internally to be ‘a bit odd’ (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012), it 
                                                             
7 John Key’s non-attendance provided a particularly stark contrast to the involvement of Australian Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard, who used the Summit as an opportunity to engage with a number of leaders, including a 
first meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. 
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is also a clear indicator of the level of importance of ASEM within the hierarchy of New 
Zealand engagement with Asia and Europe.  
 
‘Suck It and See’: Conclusion and Recommendations 
New Zealand’s approach to the ASEM process has therefore been underwhelming. Fifteen 
years after its initial expression of interest, New Zealand was finally accepted into the Asia–
Europe Meeting, but with no clear sense of the value of the process or strategy for 
engagement. Rather, its membership was an insurance policy against potential 
marginalisation should the forum eventually grow wings. Nevertheless, potential benefits of 
membership are recognised within the MFAT, even if they are not necessarily actively 
pursued. ASEM is seen: (i) as a means for addressing priority issues for New Zealand, and for 
gaining access to leaders and officials; and (ii) as a mechanism for reinforcing its 
engagement with the Asian region, demonstrating itself to be a serious and committed 
partner. Its performance in each of these areas has, however, been somewhat lacking, a 
consequence largely of the resourcing issue: with ASEM low on the list of regional priorities, 
there is no sense that the allocation of scarce resources will deliver sufficient results. 
Nevertheless, these elements can be seen as constituting a bare-bones framework on which 
to found a more proactive New Zealand strategy, one in which it demonstrates its 
commitment and resolve to the Asian region while pursuing specific priorities in a manner 
ideally light on resources. Two areas can be identified: 
1. Increasing participation; and 
2. Defining and engaging in priority areas where a contribution can be made or benefit 
gained. 
As an underlying requisite, New Zealand must engage more. If it is to gain any 
benefit from ASEM, and if it is to portray itself to be a ‘serious and committed’ participant, it 
must at a very basic level be involved. There are various ways this can be achieved. The 
most obvious is to attend fora at the senior level, at least some of the time. An ongoing 
bugbear for the Asian states is the relatively low level of representation at key ASEM 
meetings – the Summit and the FMM – particularly of European states. For the Asians, 
attendance at the appropriate level is an indicator of commitment to the process, and to 
relations between the regions (interview with Malaysian Foreign Ministry official, June 
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2012). Beyond this, however, if New Zealand is to gain the benefit of access to key leaders in 
the margins of Summits, it needs itself to be there at the appropriate level. 
Setting aside the issue of official representation, an emphasis on ASEF involvement is 
a simple and cost-effective mechanism for engaging with the process, putting as it does 
emphasis on the involvement of institutions other than MFAT. New Zealand is an active 
participant in the ASEF Board of Governors, and punches above its weight in terms of the 
resourcing of the Foundation, providing SG$100,000 (US$82,000) per year in financing (ASEF 
2011) – the sixteenth highest amount among the ASEM membership, and a significantly 
larger contribution than that of Australia, for example, a fact that has not gone unnoticed 
(interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012).8 ASEF itself is a forum for intellectual, 
cultural and people-to-people engagement, and therefore provides a structured mechanism 
through which to help make a reality of the Asia White Paper’s call for ‘more New 
Zealanders who are confident in their dealings with Asia and Asian societies, [which] will 
only come through greater familiarity and knowledge of the region and its peoples’ (MFAT 
2007, 45). More therefore needs to be done to apprise, in particular, New Zealand 
secondary and tertiary education institutions and relevant civil society organisations of the 
opportunities available under the ASEF umbrella which can foster new, or support existing, 
engagement with the Asian region. 
To a certain extent, the bread and butter of ASEM engagement is the formulation of 
initiatives, the establishment of meetings and working groups to address priority issues for 
member states. It is in this framework that the ideational and discursive aspects of ASEM 
that are increasingly highlighted take place. New Zealand engagement in such structures 
has, however, been low, and it has so far not proposed any new initiative,9 a consequence 
of its reactive rather than proactive approach. While resourcing limitations mean that New 
Zealand is unlikely ever to be a major participant in such structures, one or two priority 
areas may be manageable. And indeed there are a range of issues that would seem ripe for 
engagement, and for which involvement could usefully extend beyond MFAT to other 
                                                             
8 New Zealand began contributing to ASEF in 2010. Australia began contributing in 2011 at a rate of SG$76,615 
(US$62,000) per year (ranking twenty-third on the list). Figures are for 2011. 
9 A matter noted by other ASEM partners, and identified as an area where improved performance would be 
welcome (interview with senior Commission official, July 2011; interview with Malaysian Foreign Ministry 
official, June 2012). 
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Ministries or stakeholders (thus, to an extent, defraying costs). Two areas in particular can 
be identified: (i) education; and (ii) Pacific development.  
In 2011, New Zealand hosted more than 97,000 foreign fee-paying students at its 
secondary and tertiary institutions,10 70 per cent from its Asian and 9 per cent from its 
European ASEM partners, generating more than NZ$730 million (US$600 million) for the 
education sector (MinEdu 2012). ASEM therefore offers a significant opportunity to engage 
collectively with countries accounting for more than three quarters of foreign students on 
matters of education. And indeed, the ASEM framework has a history of dialogue on 
education matters, be this through the ASEM Education Ministers’ Meeting held annually 
since 2008,11 ongoing seminars on Quality Assurance in Higher Education, or the range of 
fora targeting matters such as cooperation between the University and business sectors. For 
New Zealand, issues such as quality assurance in feeder states are an important element in 
recruiting foreign students to postgraduate study, as is ensuring the recognition of New 
Zealand’s own qualification framework, particularly as it relates to private education 
providers such as language schools. Additionally, ASEM may provide the opportunity to 
address issues of priority to the New Zealand education sector including, for example, the 
provision of offshore education services, a core element in its international education 
strategy (see e.g. MinEdu 2011). Encouraging the participation of the Ministry of Education 
could therefore be a useful mechanism both for increasing engagement without drawing 
heavily on MFAT resources, and for addressing priority issues around New Zealand’s 
international education strategy.  
Secondly, ASEM may be useful as a mechanism for addressing New Zealand’s 
regional concerns around the issue of development. ASEM is a constructed reality, and the 
enlargement of its Asian caucus has, to an extent, involved a progressive redefinition of the 
region, at least as far as engagement with Europe is concerned. This has involved a 
transformation from an Asia of great powers and Tiger economies, to one increasingly 
inclusive of developing countries, and it is this transformation that has seen the issue of 
development emerge on to the forum’s agenda (Holland and Doidge 2012, 176). 
Development was addressed in detail for the first time at the sixth Summit in 2006 (a noted 
                                                             
10 Of these, 16 per cent are in secondary education providers, 31 per cent in Universities, and 53 per cent in 
other tertiary education providers (English language schools etc.). 
11 A New Zealand representative attended the third Education Ministers’ Meeting in Copenhagen in 2011. 
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change from the rhetorical statements of earlier meetings), with an ASEM Development 
Conference subsequently convened in 2009, demonstrating an awareness at the least of the 
need to engage with the issue.  
Nevertheless, while its importance has been recognised, development still remains 
relatively under-considered, leaving significant space to introduce issues onto the agenda 
that are of specific interest to ASEM members. One such example, from the New Zealand 
perspective, is that of Pacific development. ASEM incorporates six of the top seven donors 
of foreign aid to the Pacific,12 including China, the aid programme of which has been the 
subject of considerable debate among other donors and the broader development 
community. The role of China in the Pacific has been an object of increasing concern for the 
governments of New Zealand and Australia, and more recently also the US and the 
European Union, particularly around the nature of projects funded and the provision of soft 
loans (see e.g. McCully’s comments in AFP 2011, or those of Key in Trevett 2012). ASEM 
could therefore provide a useful umbrella under which to engage regional donors, pushing if 
not for the alignment of developmental approaches, at least for some level of agreement on 
regional development priorities, and in particular working towards the establishment of 
multinational development projects incorporating China alongside other donors. And indeed 
New Zealand has something to offer in this area, having in August 2012 agreed a joint 
project with China for a reticulated water mains system in the Cook Islands (Xinhua News 
Agency 2012), the first such cooperative undertaking. ASEM therefore provides a potential 
framework through which New Zealand can both draw the attention of its Asian partners 
further southwards, and position itself as a bridge between Europe, Asia and the Pacific on 
issues of development (see Pacific priorities outlined in MFAT 2011, 7).13 
 With all of that said, the future role of New Zealand in the Asia–Europe Meeting 
remains uncertain. As has been outlined, it seems at least feasible that New Zealand can 
develop a clearer and more active strategy for engagement while maintaining a relatively 
light touch from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Setting aside the issue of 
attendance at Summits and Foreign Ministers’ Meetings, this involves encouraging and 
                                                             
12 The top seven aid donors to the nations of the Pacific Islands Forum are, in order: Australia, US, China, 
Japan, New Zealand, European Commission and France (Hanson and Fifita 2011, 5). 
13 Such a bridging role might also be extended to include the US, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton having 




facilitating the engagement of other actors in the broader ASEM process, thus to an extent 
lifting some of the burden from MFAT itself. From a base level of fostering people-to-people 
engagement through ASEF, to the more complex process of identifying priority issues and 
facilitating the participation of relevant Ministries in Wellington, there are a range of 
options open to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. What will largely determine New 
Zealand’s level of engagement, however, is the performance of ASEM itself, and its ability to 
deliver substantive cooperation. Ultimately, therefore, when it comes to New Zealand’s role 
in the Asia–Europe Meeting, as one MFAT official commented, ‘we’ll just have to suck it and 
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APEC: Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation; ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum; ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEAN PMC: ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference; ASEM: Asia–
Europe Meeting; CER: Closer Economic Relations; EAS: East Asia Summit; FEALAC: Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation; G-20: Group of 20 Developed Countries. 
1 New Zealand Embassy/High Commission in the country. 
2 New Zealand Ambassador Cross-Accredited to the country. 
a Country has an Embassy/High Commission in New Zealand. 
b Country has an Ambassador Cross-Accredited to New Zealand. 
Figure 1: New Zealand in Asia: Forum (and selected FTA) Membership, and Diplomatic Representation 
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